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Unsophisticated Taxpayers, Rules Versus Standards,
and Form Versus Substance
Emily Cauble*
Many features of tax law can simplify the law in some senses for some
taxpayers but make it more complex in other ways and for other taxpayers.
This Essay focuses, in particular, on design choices that make the form of a
transaction more determinative of tax consequences than its substance or
that make tax law more rule like and less standard based. While such
measures may simplify matters for taxpayers who contemplate tax law prior
to acting (by making tax consequences more predictable), they can make the
law more complex for taxpayers who do not attempt to ascertain the content
of law prior to acting. As a result, these measures disadvantage
unsophisticated taxpayers who are most in need of simplification.
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INTRODUCTION
Avoiding undue complexity is often cited by lawmakers and scholars
as a justification for some of the design features of current tax law.1
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. The author would like to thank the editors of the Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal for their helpful comments and edits.
1. Some invocations of the goal of simplification may be merely window dressing—an
explanation that is offered for proposed measures that have different, truer aims. See, e.g., Emily
Cauble, Superficial Proxies for Simplicity in Tax Law, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 329, 332 (2019) (noting
that lawmakers will often describe a reduction in the number of tax brackets as a simplifying
measure when its truer aim is to reduce progressivity in the tax code); Steven A. Dean, Attractive
Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification,
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However, many provisions that offer simplification, in some sense, assist
taxpayers who least need simplification, while at the same time,
compound complexity for taxpayers who are least equipped to handle it.
For instance, measures that make tax consequences turn on the form of a
transaction rather than its substance or that ground tax law in rules rather
than standards can, in one sense, be simplifying measures in that they
make tax consequences more predictable. While such measures may
make tax law more predictable for taxpayers who contemplate tax law
prior to acting, they can make the law more complex for taxpayers who
do not attempt to ascertain the content of law prior to acting,
disadvantaging unsophisticated taxpayers who are most in need of
simplification.
A taxpayer who acts without determining the resulting tax outcome
might engage in a transaction with less favorable tax consequences than
the transaction in which he or she would have engaged if he or she had
considered each transaction’s tax treatment. The tax consequences of the
transaction selected by the nonplanner are likely to be more significantly
inferior to those of the transaction selected by the planner when tax law
is rule based and form driven than when tax law is standard based and
substance driven. When tax law is rule based and form driven, minor
nontax variations to a transaction are more likely to produce significant
tax differences than when tax law is standard based and substance driven.
When large tax differences turn on small nontax modifications to a
transaction, the nonplanner has more to lose by not planning.
Standard-based and substance-driven aspects of tax law are often
invoked to defend the tax system against potentially abusive tax planning
strategies used by sophisticated taxpayers.2 This Essay argues that
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 408–09 (2005) (noting that often what is described as tax simplification
could be more accurately described as tax deregulation); Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case
Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX. REV. 645, 647–48 (2003) (“In some cases, proposals for
simplifying the Code appear to be mere rhetorical diversions that conceal other, more controversial
objectives.”). Some invocations of the goal of simplification may be more sincere. This Essay
focuses on measures that fall into the latter category in that they provide simplification in some
genuine way. However, this Essay notes that, in many cases, even these measures may miss the
mark. They simplify the law in some respects and for some taxpayers, make it more complex in
other respects and for other taxpayers, and, on balance, may do more harm than good.
2. For discussion of how relying on rules alone, without background standards and principles
of substance, cannot defend against abusive tax planning, see, e.g., Noël B. Cunningham & James
R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 33 (2004) (“[P]romoters could easily
concoct new abusive transactions that literally complied with the rule.”); Andrew T. Hayashi, A
Theory of Facts and Circumstances, 69 ALA. L. REV. 289, 291 (2017) (“If the facts that create a
favorable inference about a hidden factor are publicized in advance, they will provide a roadmap
for well-advised individuals to create those very facts to induce factfinders to draw the inference
those individuals want.”); Calvin H. Johnson, H.R. ____, The Anti-Skunk Works Corporate Tax
Shelter Act of 1999, 84 TAX NOTES 443, 445 (1999) (“Loopholes can be created in any human tax
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standard-based and substance-driven features of tax law have the added
advantage of making tax law less complex for unsophisticated taxpayers
who are most in need of simplification.
This Essay will proceed as follows. Part I will provide an overview of
various factors that contribute to complexity at the planning stage, as
experienced both by taxpayers who assess tax consequences prior to
acting and taxpayers who do not do so. Part II will discuss the greater
propensity of rules to trap unwary taxpayers and the capacity for
standards to be more forgiving. Part III will describe the similar dynamic
at work in the case of form versus substance. Finally, Part IV will
conclude by making some suggestions for measures that could assist
unsophisticated taxpayers.

system unless the system is defended and repaired. Shelters take razor-thin fissures of no material
concern and turn them into gaping holes in the tax base.”); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty
and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 366 (2005) (“[I]t simply is not possible to
write tax laws that are devoid of all unintended loopholes.”); Martin J. McMahon Jr., Beyond a
GAAR: Retrofitting the Code to Rein in 21st Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 1721, 1722
(2003) (“The mechanical terms of specific rules . . . provide a tremendous temptation to treat the
rules as an instruction manual for creating and structuring transactions outside the ordinary course
of business or normal investments in which the taxpayer would not engage except as a result of the
tax avoidance potential of the inventive transaction.”); Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the
Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 401,
409 (2010) (“[T]hese flaws create a playground for those who engage in transactions that comply
with . . . literal language, yet result in tax consequences that Congress did not contemplate.”);
Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v.
Commissioner, 94 TAX NOTES 511, 512–13 (2002) (“Inevitably, there will be some unforeseen
interaction of the tax rules so that, if one arranges one’s affairs in just the right manner, magic
happens.”); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860–63 (1999)
(addressing the question of whether (or when) anti-abuse rules are desirable) [hereinafter Weisbach,
Formalism]. For similar discussion regarding rules, generally, see, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky &
Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 179 (2015) (“Rules allow self-seeking individuals
to ‘walk the line’ by engaging in conduct that runs against society’s interest and would be prohibited
by a standard.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 995 (1995)
(“Because rules have clear edges, they allow people to ‘evade’ them by engaging in conduct that is
technically exempted but that creates the same or analogous harms.”) For further discussion of
substance-driven aspects of tax law designed to defend against abusive tax planning, see the sources
cited infra in note 38.
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I. TAX PLANNING COMPLEXITY
Much has been written about complexity3 in tax law and in law,
generally.4 This Part will place existing observations within a framework
that aims to provide an overview of factors that are relevant to complexity
from the point of view of different types of taxpayers at the tax planning
stage.5
Complexity in tax law affects taxpayers at the planning stage by
making more onerous the process of predicting the tax consequences of
an anticipated transaction.6 In addition, complexity causes some
3. There is a growing literature that imports concepts from complexity science into studies of
legal complexity. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing
Legal Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 194–96 (2015) (describing the ways in which legal
scholars have begun to use complexity science and describing how complexity science could be
used to shed light on how complex the tax code is). As Professors Ruhl and Katz explain, “there is
a difference between complexity in the sense of ‘complicatedness’ and complexity in the sense of
system structure and behavior.” Id. at 201. The term “complexity” might be better understood, in a
formal sense, in the way in which it is defined by this body of literature, and some of the factors
that I identify as contributing to “complexity” might be more accurately described as contributing
to “complicatedness.” However, when policymakers aim to reduce “complexity,” or claim to be
taking steps to do so, they are likely referring to both complicatedness and complexity, and
therefore, the discussion in this Essay is not limited to “complexity” in the formal sense. However,
I nevertheless use the term “complexity” for ease of exposition.
4. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1
(1974); DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); Dean, supra note 1;
Donaldson, supra note 1; William G. Gale, Tax Simplification: Issues and Options, 92 TAX NOTES
1463 (2001); Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency
of the Income Tax, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 135 (1996); Stanley A. Koppelman, At-Risk and Passive
Activity Limitations: Can Complexity Be Reduced?, 45 TAX L. REV. 97 (1989); Edward J.
McCaffrey, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267 (1990); Charles E.
McClure Jr., The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REV. 25 (1989);
John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law
of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Jeffrey Partlow, The Necessity of Complexity in the Tax
System, 13 WYO. L. REV. 303 (2013); Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much
Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151 (1997); Randolph E. Paul,
Simplification of Federal Tax Laws, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 285 (1943–44); Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax
Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319
(1994); Sidney I. Roberts et al., A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325
(1972); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.
J. 1 (1992); Karla W. Simon, Tax Simplification and Justice, 36 TAX NOTES 93 (1987); Deborah
H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121
(1989); Mila Sohoni, The Idea of Too Much Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585 (2012); Stanley S.
Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail,
34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673 (1969); R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An
Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715 (2000);
Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 91 (2010).
5. Taxpayers also face complexity at the compliance stage (when they report the consequences
of transactions that have already occurred) and at the enforcement stage (when the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) audits and potentially challenges the tax consequences claimed by the taxpayer).
6. See, e.g., BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 266–67 (“We may distinguish three kinds of
complexity: . . . ‘transactional complexity’ (referring to the problems faced by taxpayers in
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taxpayers who act without adequately considering or understanding
applicable tax law to act differently than they would have had they known
the law. Furthermore, at the planning stage, complexity can cause
taxpayers who do inform themselves of applicable law to make costly
changes to their behavior.7
A. Taxpayers Who Plan
For a taxpayer who attempts to ascertain the content of tax law prior
to acting or who utilizes an advisor who attempts to do so on the
taxpayer’s behalf, complexity at the planning stage consists of anything
that increases the amount of time required to determine the likely tax
outcome of a contemplated transaction. The volume of applicable law as
well as the technical nature of relevant rules can be aggravating factors.8
When a wide array of sources must be consulted to determine tax law’s
content, the task of the taxpayer (or the taxpayer’s advisor) becomes more
arduous.9 Uncertainty will also increase the cost of predicting the tax
organizing their affairs so as to minimize their taxes within the framework of the rules) . . . .”);
McCaffrey, supra note 4, at 1271 (discussing “structural complexity”).
7. See, e.g., BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 266–67 (referring to “transactional complexity” as the
problems faced by taxpayers in organizing their affairs so as to minimize their taxes within the
framework of the rules); McCaffrey, supra note 4, at 1271 (discussing “structural complexity”).
8. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note 1, at 733–34 (“The federal tax laws are ‘complex’ because:
(1) they contain a large number of rules, (2) those several rules are highly detailed . . . (5) they
require technical expertise to comprehend fully . . . .”); McCaffrey, supra note 4, at 1270–71 (“The
first basic understanding of simplification may be termed ‘technical complexity.’ Such complexity
refers to the sheer intellectual difficulty of ascertaining the meaning of tax law.”); Andrea Monroe,
Integrity in Taxation: Rethinking Partnership Tax, 64 ALA. L. REV. 289, 300 (2012) (“Complex
provisions typically involve opaque terminology, elaborate definitional schemes, computations, or
multifactored tests.”); Schuck, supra note 4, at 3–4 (describing technicality as a feature of a
complex legal system and observing how “[t]echnical rules require special sophistication or
expertise on the part of those who wish to understand and apply them. Technicality is a function of
the fineness of the distinctions a rule makes, the specialized terminology it employs, and the refined
substantive judgments it requires. The Internal Revenue Code is probably the leading example of
technical rules.”). The technical nature of rules may matter more or less depending on the type of
taxpayer at which the provision is targeted. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 4, at 2, 5 (observing that
technical language is less of a concern when it is addressed to tax experts and applies to transactions
that rarely occur, while simplification of “mass” provisions that affect millions of taxpayers may
be more important); Donaldson, supra note 1, at 672 (“There is no question that the Code makes
for slow reading (and in many cases, re-reading). Yet the calls to make the Code more readerfriendly forget that the Code’s intended audience is not the lay taxpayer.”); Surrey, supra note 4, at
697 (“In general, the pattern here is that of experts speaking to experts, with the knowledgeable
practitioners talking to the draftsmen in the stilted, artificial language that each understands well.
But it is their language alone and not that of the less expert and uninitiated.”).
9. See, e.g., Partlow, supra note 4, at 320 (“With broad statutes and imprecise language, the task
of filling in the detail is left to the courts and the Treasury. As courts interpret the law, the ‘simple’
and easily understood words in the Code become complex because their meanings stem from
judicial interpretation and can be understood only by reference to case law.”); Schuck, supra note
4, at 3–4 (listing differentiation as a feature of a complex legal system and stating, “[a] legal system
is institutionally differentiated insofar as it contains a number of decision structures . . . .”).
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consequences of a proposed transaction.10
A closer match between applicable law and the taxpayer’s or his or her
advisor’s intuitive expectations can streamline the process of ascertaining
applicable law’s content. Law is more amenable to quick understanding
when it conforms to our expectations. In addition, when law is more
consistent with expectations, a taxpayer or his or her advisor can more
readily reach a conclusion with some confidence about the tax treatment
of a transaction that is not explicitly covered by existing law—when
applicable law forms a more coherent, intuitive framework it is easier to
predict the tax consequences of facts that are not squarely covered by
existing rules.11
Consistency in the law can also facilitate easier determinations of the
law’s content.12 Thus, others have suggested that the adoption of uniform
definitions of various terms across different Internal Revenue Code
provisions could simplify tax law in some respects.13 On an even more
10. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 4, at 327–28 (describing how the difficulty of reaching a
sufficiently certain conclusion can prevent some transactions from going forward); Schuck, supra
note 4, at 3 (listing indeterminacy or uncertainty as a feature of a complex legal system).
11. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 4, at 699 (observing that, when tax law is not intuitive, “[I]t
becomes impossible to fly by the seat of one’s tax pants. . . . While this is not a serious calamity,
there is a need to provide working room for the use of tax instinct. An intelligent statutory structure
makes it possible to rely on a well-trained tax instinct to provide the probable answer to the
problems unforeseen by the draftsman.”).
12. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 4, at 696 (“The sections and provisions carrying the rules for
the treatment of a given area must possess an internal consistency, so that the framework and inner
logic of the statutory solution can be grasped.”). Consistency across rules and with statutory
purpose also eases the process of determining the likely tax consequences of a transaction not
explicitly covered by existing rules and makes it more likely that taxpayers who act without
verifying the content of law might make correct guesses. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note 1, at 737–
38 (“Tax expenditures routinely violate basic principles of the federal income tax. This breeds
confusion among taxpayers. An individual, for instance, might know of the home mortgage interest
deduction and reasonably extrapolate from this rule that all home-related expenses are deductible.
Of course, this extrapolation is wrong, but the mortgage interest deduction reasonably leads
taxpayers into thinking other, related expenditures may be deductible. Some taxpayers will likely
claim such deductions without checking for authority.”); Deborah L. Paul, supra note 4, at 161–62
(“[C]oherence eases application of a tax regime. Under a coherent regime, people may interpret the
law in the absence of a specific authority on point by considering the regime’s purposes. Under an
incoherent regime, interpretation of the law is more difficult because the competing purposes
embodied in the regime favor inconsistent interpretations.”).
13. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note 1, at 727–28 (“Consistent definitions would do a lot to
reduce the tax complexity of phase outs.”); Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who
Don’t and Those Who Know Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax
Returns, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 113, 127 (2013) (“Olson recommends that Congress consolidate the
family status provisions as a measure to simplify the Code.”); Richard M. Lipton, Statement of
Richard M. Lipton on Behalf of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation Before the
Committee on Finance of the United States Senate on the Subject of Tax Simplification April 26,
2001, 54 TAX LAW. 617, 631–32 (2001) (proposing standardization of attribution rules); McClure,
supra note 4, at 53 (“Under a rational policy there should be fewer such rules and the rules would
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ambitious scale, consistency would be well served by taxing all similar
transactions in the same manner to the greatest extent possible.14
B. Nonplanners
If a taxpayer engages in a transaction without attempting to determine
its tax consequences, the only cost caused by complexity that burdens the
taxpayer at the planning stage is the potential cost of engaging in a
transaction that differs from the transaction in which the taxpayer would
have engaged had he or she assessed the relevant tax consequences prior
to acting.15 When small nontax changes to a transaction produce radical
differences in tax outcome, this cost is likely to be higher. The idea that
making a slight modification to a transaction could save significant tax
liability may be counterintuitive so that an unsophisticated taxpayer may
not think to ask about tax consequences ahead of time (or may lack the

be consistent.”); Partlow, supra note 4, at 328 (“Congress could eliminate one area of unnecessary
complexity by adopting a uniform definition of qualified education expenses for purposes of the
various education tax incentives, qualified state tuition programs, and education IRAs.”); Schenk,
supra note 4, at 129 (“[D]efinitions and qualifying thresholds should be as simple and uniform as
possible.”).
14. See, e.g., BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 267 (“Transactional complexity arises basically
because of the possibility that economically equivalent activities may have very different tax
consequences, depending on the precise way the transactions are structured. . . . Rules with a high
degree of economic consistency serve transactional simplicity, although they may impose costs in
the form of compliance and rule complexity.”). Taxing similar transactions similarly eases the
learning process. Taxing similar transactions similarly might also reduce planning costs that take
the form of taxpayers modifying their contemplated transactions. It is also possible that taxing some
transactions similarly could induce taxpayers to make even more costly modifications to their
transactions to obtain more favorable tax treatment. For further discussion, see, e.g., David M.
Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1320 (2001)
(“[E]ven if some planning is stopped, total planning waste could still increase if those who continue
to plan face higher costs.”); David A. Weisbach, Disrupting the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA.
TAX REV. 971, 973 (2007) [hereinafter Weisbach, Disrupting the Market] (“Thus, as the
government shuts down the easy to find and use shelters, taxpayers must spend more to find new
ones and also more to implement new ones.”); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and
Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1669–70 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Line
Drawing] (“A line can be too hard to avoid, at least from an efficiency perspective. . . . If a line is
too hard to avoid, there may be few shifts, but each shift will have a large cost.”); David A.
Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 239 (2002) [hereinafter Weisbach,
Ten Truths] (“[B]ecause we cannot perfectly identify shelters, attacks on shelters make those
shelters that remain worse.”); Philip A. Curry, Claire Hill & Francesco Parisi, Creating Failures in
the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943, 945 (2007) (discussing how policymakers face
a trade-off when considering taking steps to attack current tax planning strategies, namely, the
trade-off between (i) costs arising from taxpayers’ use of those current tax planning strategies and
(ii) costs arising from taxpayers’ search for new tax planning strategies once the existing methods
are attacked).
15. This group of taxpayers does not face the cost of determining what tax law provides as they
do not attempt to do so, and this group of taxpayers does not face the cost of redesigning their
transactions to obtain more favorable tax consequences because these taxpayers do not contemplate
tax consequences prior to acting.

336

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

resources to obtain advice even if the possibility that advice could be
beneficial did occur to the taxpayer). If the taxpayer does not ask for
advice, he or she might happen upon a transaction that produces vastly
inferior tax consequences compared to the tax treatment of an otherwise
quite similar transaction.
C. Trade-Offs
Because different features of tax law are more likely to impose costs
on different taxpayers, measures that might make law simpler for one
group of taxpayers can often increase costs borne by another group of
taxpayers.16 Of particular relevance to this Essay, simplification
measures that cater to taxpayers who consider tax ramifications prior to
acting can, in some cases, exacerbate the plight faced by taxpayers who
do not do so, as discussed in greater detail in Parts II and III below.
II. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS
When lawmakers adopt rules in lieu of standards, they may succeed in
making things easier for those who plan, but they risk harming taxpayers
who engage in transactions without considering resulting tax
consequences. A “rule” specifies, clearly and in advance, the tax
consequences resulting from various activities.17 A “standard” provides
only limited guidance to taxpayers before they act, deferring definitive
determinations of tax consequences to after-the-fact analysis by the IRS
and courts.18 Thus, the presence of a rule makes it less costly to determine
tax consequences ahead of time.19 At the same time, however, rules make
it so that large differences in tax consequences can turn on small nontax
differences, or, stated differently, rules make it so that significant tax

16. See, e.g., Sohoni, supra note 4, at 1608 (“Complexity is easy to redistribute but hard to
reduce.”); Wright, supra note 4, at 716 (“We can reduce legal complexity in one respect without
also reducing the law’s complexity in other respects, and usually only at the cost of greater
complexity in other respects.”).
17. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
560 (1992) (“This Article will adopt such a definition, in which the only distinction between rules
and standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after
individuals act.”); see also Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA.
TAX REV. 295, 330 (2011) (“A rule . . . is formal, and in the great majority of circumstances the
rule either clearly applies or clearly does not.”).
18. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 330 (“Application of a standard tends to be
contextual and fact-sensitive.”); Kaplow, supra note 17, at 560 (“A standard may entail leaving
both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator.”).
19. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 17, at 577 (“[R]ules’ benefits arise from two sources:
Individuals may spend less in learning the content of the law, and individuals may become better
informed about rules than standards and thus better conform their behavior to the law.”).
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consequences may depend on arbitrary distinctions.20 With standards, on
the other hand, tax consequences are more difficult to predict ahead of
time, and also obtaining guidance on the standard’s content often requires
consulting more diffuse sources like case law and IRS rulings. However,
the presence of a standard can also reduce the risk that small, insignificant
nontax differences will produce drastic differences in tax outcome.
Therefore, unsophisticated taxpayers may be less likely to commit costly
errors when faced with standards.21 To put it differently, standards may
be less likely than rules to trap unwary taxpayers.
To the extent that rules are easier to apply than standards, 22 at first it
might seem that standards would disadvantage unsophisticated taxpayers
even more severely than rules. However, although rules may be easier to
apply than standards, ease of application assists only taxpayers who
attempt to apply the rules.23 While sophisticated taxpayers will often
20. This depends in part on how the rule is designed because some rules may be more arbitrary
than others. For further discussion of rules’ arbitrariness, see, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 43–44
(“[The] essential feature [of mathematical rules] is the failure to distinguish between individual
circumstances in their application in a way that is more pronounced than other rules. In short, the
mathematical rule is overtly arbitrary. This overt arbitrariness accounts for its relative
determinacy. . . . [A]rbitrariness, to the extent it achieves determinacy, may be seen to do so at the
sacrifice of legitimacy.”); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 992 (“If strictly followed, the rule will often
produce arbitrariness and errors in particular cases.”); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 68 (1983) (“A rule that makes eligibility for disability
insurance turn on one’s birth date, the argument runs, fails adequately to discriminate between those
who are capable and those who are incapable of supporting themselves.”).
21. In a similar vein, Professor Kovach argues that unsophisticated advisors may fare better
under standards than rules, stating, “if many important tax determinations are based on facts and
circumstances tests, practitioners who are not very familiar with a particular taxation subject might
experience less anxiety about their lack of knowledge, since vague standards allow for at least
arguable compliance over a wide range of putatively misguided transactions. Error under bright
line rules is more clearly established and displayed.” Richard J. Kovach, Bright Lines, Facts and
Circumstances Tests, and Complexity in Federal Taxation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1287, 1315–16
(1996); see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 600
(1988) (discussing how crystalline rules in property law tend to disadvantage “fools” and favor
“sharp dealers” and stating that fuzzier standards “will also reassure those of us who fear we may
be made fools; we can go about our business and take part in the world of trade without cowering
at home because we think we need to hire a lawyer and an accountant every time we leave the car
at a commercial parking lot.”).
22. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 17, at 577 (“[R]ules’ benefits arise from two sources:
Individuals may spend less in learning the content of the law, and individuals may become better
informed about rules than standards and thus better conform their behavior to the law.”); id. at 569
(“Because a standard requires a prediction of how an enforcement authority will decide questions
that are already answered in the case of a rule, advice about a standard is more costly.”).
23. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 17, at 564 (“[T]he advantage of rules at the stage involving
individuals’ behavior depends on whether individuals choose to acquire legal advice before they
act.”). Professor Kaplow argues that individuals may be less likely to acquire information about
standards ahead of time because standards are more difficult to apply. See id. (“If . . . the cost of
predicting standards is high, individuals will not choose to become as well informed about how
standards would apply to their behavior.”). For that reason, it may be true that a taxpayer who is
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attempt to apply tax law before acting, either directly or by seeking tax
advice, unsophisticated taxpayers may be unaware of the potential benefit
from consulting with a tax advisor prior to acting or may lack the
resources to obtain such advice. Therefore, unsophisticated taxpayers
may systematically fail to reap the benefits of easy-to-apply rules.
Standards, due to their flexible nature, can be more forgiving. To state it
differently, although a rule may be easier to apply than a standard when
a person seeks information about the rule, a standard may be, in some
sense, “easier” than a rule for unsophisticated taxpayers. A standard may
be “easier” for unsophisticated taxpayers because it may be more likely
than a rule to coincide with a taxpayer’s uninformed expectations in that,
under a standard, small nontax changes will not necessarily produce
significant tax differences to the same degree as what occurs with a rule.24
To demonstrate, consider, for example, the provisions governing the
tax treatment of the sale of a home. Section 121 of the Internal Revenue
Code allows a taxpayer to exclude from gross income up to a certain
amount of gain from the sale of a principal residence, provided that
various requirements are met.25 A single taxpayer can exclude up to
$250,000 of gain, provided that he or she owned the home and used it as
his or her principal residence for periods of time aggregating at least two
years during the five-year period ending on the date of sale.26 However,
subject to certain exceptions, the taxpayer may use this exemption only
once every two years.27 If a taxpayer falls short of the two-year
requirement for owning the home (or using it as a principal residence) or
if a taxpayer has sold another principal residence within two years and
exempted the resulting gain under § 121, the taxpayer still may be eligible
to exclude gain (up to a reduced maximum amount) if the sale of the

sophisticated enough to seek advice will be more likely to obtain information about rules than
standards. However, unsophisticated taxpayers may be less likely to seek any legal advice ahead of
time because they may be unaware of the benefits of tax planning.
24. See Kaplow, supra note 17, at 562 (describing how individuals either seek legal advice or
“act based on their best guess of the law”).
25. I.R.C. § 121.
26. See I.R.C. §§ 121(a)–(b)(1) (providing that a single taxpayer can exclude up to $250,000 of
gain from income as long as the two-year ownership and use requirements are met). A married
couple filing a joint return can exclude up to $500,000 of gain from sale of a principal residence
provided that either spouse owned the residence for at least two years during the five-year period
ending on the date of sale, both spouses used the home as a principal residence for at least two years
during the five-year period ending on the date of sale, and neither spouse has excluded gain from
sale of another home under § 121 within the preceding two years. I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(A).
27. See I.R.C. § 121(b)(3) (providing that the taxpayer may only exclude gain from income for
one sale or exchange within any two-year period).
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taxpayer’s current home was prompted by change of place of
employment, health, or unforeseen circumstances.28
Various limitations on the availability of the exclusion contained in
§ 121 are designed as rules. In order to be eligible for the benefit of § 121,
the taxpayer must have owned the home for at least two years, the
taxpayer must have used the home as his or her principal residence for at
least two years,29 and the taxpayer must not have used § 121 to exclude
gain from sale of another residence within two years.30 The legislative
history surrounding the adoption of these rules in 1997 is devoid of
discussion of the rationale for imposing these two-year requirements.31
Ostensibly, the limitations are motivated by the desire to impose some
limitation on the tax benefit that any given taxpayer can obtain from the
provision; or by the aim of discerning whether the property is, in some
sense, really the taxpayer’s home as opposed to predominantly an
investment; or by both considerations.
Designing these limitations as rules produces arbitrary outcomes that
can trap unwary taxpayers. If a single taxpayer sells a home after owning
it and using it as a principal residence for one year and eleven months,
the taxpayer may have to include the entire gain in income, while if the
same taxpayer waited one more month, the taxpayer could exclude the
entire gain (up to $250,000) from income. The potential harshness of this
result is softened by provisions that provide relief if the sale was
motivated by certain factors—change in place of employment, health, or
unforeseen circumstances.32 However, relief will not be available if the
sale is not prompted by any such factor.
Rather than adopting rules limiting the applicability of § 121,
lawmakers might have adopted standards. For instance, assume the
reason for imposing the two-year limitations on the applicability of § 121
was to determine whether the property was really the taxpayer’s home
rather than predominantly an investment opportunity—in other words,

28. See I.R.C. § 121(c) (allowing a taxpayer who fails to meet the ownership or use requirement
or who has excluded gain from sale of another principal residence within two years to nevertheless
exclude gain from sale of a residence, up to a reduced maximum amount, in certain circumstances).
29. See I.R.C. § 121(a) (providing the two-year ownership and use requirements). This “rule”
also contains an embedded standard—the determination of whether or not something is a “principal
residence” depends on the application of a standard.
30. See I.R.C. § 121(b)(3) (providing that the taxpayer may only exclude gain from income
from one sale or exchange within any two-year period).
31. For discussion of the legislative history, see, e.g., Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax
Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 ALA. L. REV. 187, 195–97 (2013) (describing the legislative history
of the provision).
32. See I.R.C. § 121(c) (allowing a taxpayer who fails to meet the ownership or use requirement
or who has excluded gain from sale of another principal residence within two years to nevertheless
exclude gain from sale of a residence, up to a reduced maximum amount, in certain circumstances).

340

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

imagine the provisions were designed to ensure that the taxpayer
genuinely intended to live at the residence for some significant period of
time and was not, instead, planning to flip the property for a quick profit.
Congress could have called on courts to apply a facts and circumstances
test to determine whether the taxpayer possessed this requisite intent. To
apply the standard, courts might examine a number of factors—how long
the taxpayer owned and lived at the property, the reason for the sale,
whether the sale generated a significant profit, how many other sales the
taxpayer made, whether the taxpayer had other sources of income, the
extent to which the taxpayer improved the property, and other relevant
facts. I should note that I am not advocating for such a change in the law
but merely using it as an illustration of the effects of standards versus
rules.
Such a standard-based regime might be less likely to trap unwary
taxpayers.33 The homeowner who sells a home after owning it for one
year and eleven months stands a better chance of still obtaining the
exclusion if other facts support the conclusion that the taxpayer possessed
the requisite intent. It is true that, even with standards, courts must
inevitably distinguish among and allot different tax treatment to different
taxpayers. When sorting taxpayers between those who are entitled to the
benefit of § 121 and those who are not, courts must draw lines, and,
inevitably, somewhat similar taxpayers would be treated differently even
under a standard.34 Nevertheless, because courts could evaluate multiple
factors (rather than just the time period of ownership) in a flexible way
when making distinctions among taxpayers, courts applying a standard
might be able to sort taxpayers into categories less arbitrarily than the
existing rules do.35
33. It is also possible that a standard, might, in some cases, be better designed at carrying out
the purpose of the limitations, if one of the purposes is, indeed, to prevent § 121 from applying in
cases in which the homeowner is engaged in house flipping. For discussion of how the current
regime may encourage house flipping, see Kahng, supra note 31, at 215–21 (discussing how the
exclusion created an incentive for some homeowners to become “serial ‘flippers’”).
34. See, e.g., Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 14, at 1646–47 (concluding that, inevitably,
similar taxpayers will be treated differently). For related discussion, see, e.g., Kaplow, supra note
17, at 577–79 (discussing the possibility that precedent can transform a standard into a rule); Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 413 (1985) (“[T]he ‘balancing’ or ‘totality of
circumstances’ tests that are often used in constitutional law . . . viewed in isolation look very
flexible. But as soon as we consider how they are applied by judges, it becomes apparent that these
tests merely defer the constraints on judicial decision making to some external source such as
precedent.”); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 965 (“Once we define the term ‘excessive’ [in a law
prohibiting driving at excessive speeds], we may well end up with a rule.”); David O. Taylor,
Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV.
415, 426 (2013) (“[I]n time, standards may crystallize into rules and rules may dissolve into
standards.”).
35. However, this difference should not be overstated given that a rule could also employ
multiple factors.
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While use of a standard might be less likely to trap unwary taxpayers,36
it also would make it more difficult for taxpayers who contemplate tax
consequences prior to sale to determine those consequences. Under
current law, if a taxpayer has met the two-year requirements, he or she
can be assured of obtaining the benefits of § 121; however, under a
standard, the same taxpayer would not be able to predict the resulting tax
consequences with certainty. Thus, by opting to use a rule, lawmakers
have provided certainty to taxpayers who contemplate tax consequences
prior to acting while increasing the risk of trapping unwary taxpayers.
III. FORM VERSUS SUBSTANCE
As discussed above in Part II, when lawmakers adopt rules in lieu of
standards, they may succeed in making tax consequences more
predictable for those who plan, but they risk harming taxpayers who
engage in transactions without considering resulting tax consequences.
Relatedly, when lawmakers opt to allow for tax consequences to turn on
the form of a transaction rather than its substance, doing so has the same
effect—providing certainty for planners while setting more traps for
unwary taxpayers. Allowing tax consequences to turn on form makes tax
consequences more predictable for planners. However, because formdriven tax consequences increase the extent to which small nontax
changes will affect tax outcomes, form-driven tax consequences are less
intuitive and, therefore, more likely to trap unwary taxpayers.
Stated differently, tax law is more likely to match intuitive
expectations if transactions that have the same substance receive the same
tax treatment even if they vary in form.37 In such a world, a taxpayer who
36. The same objective could be served by other means. As one example, lawmakers could
convert a bright-line rule into a safe harbor. For discussion of safe harbors, see generally Emily
Cauble, Safe Harbors in Tax Law, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1385 (2015), and Susan C. Morse, Safe
Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385 (2016). In addition, rules could be
designed in ways that are more forgiving of unwary taxpayers. In the case of § 121, the unforgiving
nature of the two-year requirements stem, in part, from the fact that the rules produce a cliff effect.
The rules could be replaced with rules that contained a phase-in. For example, in all cases, not just
cases in which the sale was attributable to the reasons listed in § 121(c), the $250,000 amount could
be subject to a phase-in based on the length of ownership. For instance, if a taxpayer had owned
the home for only one year, rather than lose the benefits of § 121 entirely, the taxpayer would be
entitled to exclude up to $125,000 even if the sale was not precipitated by one of the reasons listed
in § 121(c). As another example, if a taxpayer had used § 121 within the last two years to exclude
gain from sale of another home, rather than lose the benefits of § 121 entirely, the taxpayer could
be able to exclude from income gain up to $250,000 reduced by the amount of gain that went
untaxed on the previous sale.
37. “Form” is a term of art in tax law. It generally refers to aspects of a business arrangement
or transaction that are within a taxpayer’s control and that could have been altered without changing
the arrangement’s or transaction’s economic effects. Thus, the concept of form includes not only
the “form” of a transaction in the everyday sense of the word (such as the steps by which a
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does not ascertain the content of taw law prior to engaging in a transaction
is less likely to bear the cost of a missed opportunity to engage in a similar
transaction with more favorable tax consequences. By contrast, designing
the law so that slight changes to the form of a transaction can radically
change its tax outcome is a recipe for costly missteps by uninformed
taxpayers.
Designing tax law so that transactions with the same underlying
substance receive the same tax treatment, regardless of form, can be
accomplished generally in one of two ways. One approach involves use
of various doctrines in tax law that tend to employ facts-andcircumstances tests, making use of standards rather than rules. When this
approach is used to make law substance based, substance versus form
represents a subset of the general distinction between standards and rules.
Such doctrines include the substance-over-form doctrine, the step
transaction doctrine, the economic substance doctrine, and a number of
anti-abuse rules applicable to specific areas of tax law such as the
partnership anti-abuse rules.38 In very general terms, these doctrines work
in the following manner. Suppose that a taxpayer engages in a transaction
using one form (“Transaction B”) and suppose that another transaction
(“Transaction A”) would have the same substance (in other words, it
would achieve the same nontax objectives) but would have involved a
different form (such as reaching the same outcome in a less convoluted
manner that involved fewer steps). Imagine Transaction A would receive
less favorable tax treatment than the tax treatment that the taxpayer
transaction is undertaken), but also other aspects of a transaction or arrangement such as labels
adopted by the taxpayer and whether the taxpayer files a given tax election. “Substance” refers to
aspects of a transaction that a taxpayer cannot easily change without having a significant effect on
the nontax aspects of the transaction. Thus, it includes things such as the pretax economic outcome
that the transaction is intended to achieve.
38. Literature discussing these doctrines and rules is extensive. See generally Ellen P. Aprill,
Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 9 (2001);
Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Mark P. Gergen,
The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 131 (2001); Daniel Halperin, Are AntiAbuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW. 807 (1995); James S. Halpern, Putting the Cart Before
the Horse: Determining Economic Substance Independent of the Language of the Code, 30 VA.
TAX REV. 327 (2010); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX
LAW. 235 (1999); David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be
Applied?, 60 TAX L. REV. 29 (2006); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in
Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 (1982) (reviewing BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS (Warren, Gorham, & Lamont, 3rd ed. 1981)); Jeffrey L. Kwall &
Kristina Maynard, Dethroning King Enterprises, 58 TAX LAW. 1 (2004); Leandra Lederman,
W(h)ither Economic Substance, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389 (2010); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance
and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365 (1988); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths
About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX
L. REV. 325 (2002); Weisbach, Disrupting the Market, supra note 14; Weisbach, Ten Truths, supra
note 14; Martin J. McMahon Jr., Economic Substance, Purposive Activity, and Corporate Tax
Shelters, 94 TAX NOTES 1017 (2002).
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claims as a result of engaging in Transaction B. If Transaction A is truer
to the underlying substance of the transaction than Transaction B, the IRS
can successfully impose upon Transaction B the same tax consequences
that would have followed from Transaction A.
Using the substance-over-form doctrine and related doctrines entails
uncertainty. The distinction between form and substance in tax law is not
always clear-cut, and it is not always obvious whether one transactional
form is truer to a transaction’s underlying substance than an alternative
form.39 Thus, using this approach to make tax law more intuitive can
make law less certain, which can, in some respects, increase planning
costs for taxpayers who consider tax outcomes prior to acting.
Another approach to ensuring that transactions with the same
substance receive the same tax treatment regardless of form makes use of
rules (at least to some degree) and specifically identifies different
transactional forms that have the same substance and grants them the
same tax treatment. This latter approach expands the volume and
technical detail of tax law.40 As a result, this approach, too, can
exacerbate planning complexity, at least in some respect, for taxpayers
who contemplate tax consequences prior to acting.41 Thus, efforts to
39. See, e.g., Isenbergh, supra note 38, at 865–66 (“When someone calls a dog a cow and then
seeks a subsidy provided by statute for cows, the obvious response is that is not what the statute
means. It may also happen that rich people who would not otherwise have cows buy them to gain
cow subsidies. Here, when people say (as they do) that this is not what the statute means, they are
in fact saying something quite different. Many of the difficulties that bedevil that pursuit of
‘substance’ and ‘form’ in taxation stem from the assimilation of these two fact patterns.”).
40. Taking the approach of specifically identifying transactions that will be treated similarly,
rather than relying on more general substance-over-form standards, gives rise to a proliferation in
applicable rules. For this reason, Professor Weisbach observes that there is a tendency for rules in
tax law to be more complicated than standards. Building on observations by Professor Surrey,
Professor Weisbach argues that “rules are systematically more complex than standards because
rules can less afford to overlook uncommon transactions than can standards.” See Weisbach,
Formalism, supra note 2, at 861, 867–870 (elaborating upon this reason for the greater complexity
of rules). For related discussion, see, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 2, at 6 (“In addition
to being valid, we also believe that, as a general proposition, it is sound tax policy to use broad
standards to administer the tax law . . . . This approach allows the Service to use broad standards to
administer the tax law in place of a collection of narrow rules that must be constantly changed in a
hopeless attempt to keep pace with the latest tax gimmick.”).
41. See also BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 267 (“Of particular importance is the tension between
rule and transactional complexity. Transactional complexity arises basically because of the
possibility that economically equivalent activities may have very different tax consequences,
depending on the precise way the transactions are structured . . . . Rules with a high degree of
economic consistency serve transactional simplicity, although they may impose costs in the form
of compliance and rule complexity.”); Walter J. Blum, Simplification of the Federal Income Tax
Law, 10 TAX L. REV. 239, 250 (1955) (“In theory it would be possible to create a system which
would bring virtually all items of economic enhancement into the tax equation without any
distinctions among them . . . . This theoretical model would embody a minimum of distinctions and
hence a minimum of rules, and in this respect, it would be the ultimate in simplicity. However, a
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allow substance to prevail over form can make tax law more intuitive
(and, thus, simpler, in a sense, for taxpayers who act without considering
tax consequences), but, at the same time, impose costs on taxpayers who
do plan.
At the other end of the substance-form spectrum, some tax law
measures advanced under the heading of “simplification,” achieve their
purported simplification objective by prioritizing form over substance. A
quintessential example of this approach is the use of tax elections. 42 In
many situations, a taxpayer can make an election that will affect the tax
consequences of a transaction.43 Elections available to taxpayers include
those that determine how certain business entities are classified,44 various
partnership tax elections that determine how tax items are shared among
partners45 or that determine the tax consequences following transfers of
partnership interests or partnership distributions,46 and elections that
affect the tax consequences of certain corporate acquisitions.47
Regardless of whether a tax election is made, the nontax results of a
transaction will remain the same.48 In other words, due to a purely formal
distinction, one transaction will lead to very different tax consequences
than another transaction. The only difference between the transactions is
that the taxpayer makes a particular tax election with respect to one
transaction but does not make the same tax election with respect to the
other transaction. Because the only dissimilarity between the transactions
is one of form, by granting the ability to make a tax election, lawmakers
give form a preeminent role.

tax law that approached perfect neutrality in this sense would carry with it great administrative
burdens.”); McClure, supra note 4, at 42 (“There are cases in which provisions that complicate
rules or compliance lead to transactional simplicity.”).
42. For further discussion of tax elections, see generally Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax:
Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. LEGIS.
21 (2010), and Edward Yorio, The Revocability of Federal Tax Elections, 44 FORDHAM L. REV.
463 (1975).
43. This article uses the term “tax elections” to refer to explicit elections, or opportunities for a
taxpayer to obtain different tax treatment without changing any of the nontax features of his or her
behavior or transactions. Taxpayers can also make implicit elections because tax law affords
opportunities for a taxpayer to obtain different tax treatment by changing some nontax features of
his or her behavior or transactions. For further discussion of explicit tax elections, see generally,
Field, supra note 42, and Yorio, supra note 42.
44. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701–2.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.704–3.
46. I.R.C. § 754.
47. I.R.C. § 338.
48. See, e.g., Field, supra note 42, at 30 (“Explicit elections, by definition, affect taxes only;
they lack non-tax legal impact.”).
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A commonly offered justification for tax elections is simplification.49
There are three respects in which the argument may have merit. First, by
making tax consequences turn on form, tax elections grant certainty—by
simply filing a given form or reporting in a certain way on a tax return, a
taxpayer generally can be assured of receiving specified tax treatment.50
Second, explicit tax elections obviate the need to make implicit tax
elections that might be costlier—an implicit tax election involves a
taxpayer obtaining more desirable tax treatment by making changes to
the nontax form of his or her transactions that might be more significant
than the change of form (such as checking a different box) that an explicit
tax election entails.51 Third, some elections ease compliance costs by
offering taxpayers an option that is computationally simpler and involves
less recordkeeping.52
The first two effects of tax elections offer benefits at the planning stage
to taxpayers who contemplate the tax consequences of transactions prior
to acting. However, by making form preeminent, tax elections also make
law less consistent with intuitive expectations. When tax elections are
available, a taxpayer who does not contemplate tax law prior to acting
runs the risk of forgoing more favorable tax consequences unless the
default treatment provided by law to taxpayers who do not make an
election is more favorable.53 In other words, as others have observed, tax

49. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 1, at 412–21 (discussing how this justification has been offered
in the context of the entity classification rules and observing that the entity classification rules could
better be described as representing deregulation rather than simplification).
50. See, e.g., Field, supra note 42, at 49–50 (“Explicit elections can simplify the classification
process for taxpayers by eliminating the detailed inquiry required by a facts and circumstances
test. . . . In addition, classification via an explicit election increases taxpayer certainty regarding a
desired classification—taxpayers need not rely on a judgment made after weighing facts and
circumstances, which might put them in tenuous positions in close cases.”).
51. See, e.g., Field, supra note 42, at 37 (“Accordingly, using explicit elections to alleviate
discontinuity reduces taxpayers’ incentives to alter their business decisions regarding the structure
of a business or business transaction in order to obtain specific tax treatments. Thus, explicit
elections enable taxpayers to focus on the non-tax business and legal consequences, rather than the
tax ones, when planning and effectuating transactions. This can enhance efficiency by relieving
taxpayers of the need both to waste resources to restructure a desired transaction and to use a
transaction structure that is suboptimal from a business perspective in order to obtain a particular
tax treatment.”).
52. See, e.g., id. at 53–54 (“For example, a taxpayer’s ability to choose between taking the
standard deduction and taking itemized deductions is, very fundamentally, an election intended to
provide simplicity—the availability of the standard deduction relieves a taxpayer from having to
keep track of all of his itemizable deductions.”).
53. See, e.g., id. at 31 (“Additionally, an election, while technically available to all eligible
taxpayers, may be functionally available only to the wealthiest, most sophisticated group of
taxpayers, who can best navigate the complexity of the election process. As with tax planning in
general, other taxpayers may lack the knowledge or resources to pay for advice that would enable
them to take full advantage of the election.”).
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elections can act as a trap for unwary taxpayers.54 Because explicit tax
elections can make tax law easier for taxpayers who act based on
knowledge of law but potentially make law more complicated for
taxpayers who do not do so, at least some tax elections represent
simplification measures that cater to taxpayers who consider tax
ramifications prior to acting but exacerbate the plight faced by taxpayers
who do not do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
Standard-based and substance-driven aspects of tax law are often
invoked to defend the tax system against potentially abusive tax planning
strategies used by sophisticated taxpayers.55 This Essay discusses another
potential advantage of standard-based and substance-driven tax
provisions—namely, their capacity to be more forgiving of
unsophisticated taxpayers.
Bearing in mind the more forgiving nature of standard- and substancebased determinations, there are several steps lawmakers might consider
taking in appropriate circumstances. First, in some sense, all rules that
favor taxpayers are not strictly rules because overarching tax law
doctrines and anti-abuse rules, in some sense, make the outcome of every
rule that favors a taxpayer subject to potential challenge by the IRS.56 If
a transaction technically complies with the literal language of a rule but
undermines its purpose, the IRS might successfully assert that a taxpayer
is not entitled to his or her claimed tax consequences. This helps to
address the concern that rules alone do not adequately defend the tax
system against abusive tax planning strategies. To address the concern
that rules trap unwary taxpayers, there might be more scope for allowing
an unsophisticated taxpayer to overcome the results of a rule that
disfavors the taxpayer in some circumstances.57
54. See, e.g., id. at 31 (discussing how, as a practical matter, some elections may be available
only to wealthy taxpayers).
55. See generally supra note 38 and accompanying text.
56. For further discussion of these doctrines and rules, see generally supra note 38.
57. As an example, consider the wash sale rules. Imagine a taxpayer holds stock that has
declined in value, and the taxpayer would like to deduct the loss for tax purposes but, for nontax
reasons, would like to continue to own the stock. Absent the wash sale rules and assuming the
transactions would not be recast under substance-over-form principles, the taxpayer could achieve
both objectives by selling the stock to an unrelated party and repurchasing the same stock shortly
thereafter. To prevent this type of tax motivated transaction, § 1091 disallows the deduction of the
loss if the sale and purchase occur within a specified time of each other. If, within a period
beginning 30 days before the date of the sale of stock or securities and ending 30 days after the date
of such sale, a taxpayer has acquired, or has entered into a contract or option to acquire,
substantially identical stock or securities, then no deduction is allowed for loss recognized on the
sale. I.R.C. § 1091. Because engaging in a sale and purchase within 30 days results in an inability
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Second, in some contexts, tax law may be inevitably form-driven. In
these contexts, lawmakers can sometimes take steps that increase the
odds that unsophisticated taxpayers can make informed decisions when
selecting a form by allowing the selection of form to be made in
connection with filing a tax return. Linking the selection of form to the
filing of a tax return may help unsophisticated taxpayers because they
may be more likely to receive expert advice in connection with filing a
return than in connection with undertaking everyday transactions.
Individuals are generally aware of the requirement to file tax returns, and
if they cannot comply independently, they often seek assistance. By
contrast, many taxpayers may be unaware of the myriad ways in which
altering their behavior or transactions can affect tax consequences. Thus,
at the planning stage, unsophisticated taxpayers are likely left to their own
devices while they may be more likely to seek expert assistance at the tax
filing stage. Ultimately, whether this is true is an empirical question.
However, it is quite plausibly the case, and existing data provide at least
some support.58
If it is true that unsophisticated taxpayers are more likely to benefit
from expert advice at the tax return filing stage, in some cases, it might
be advisable to allow for the selection of form at that stage and in a way
that invites seeking advice about the decision in connection with
to the deduct the loss, sales and purchases that, notwithstanding § 1091, occur within 30 days will,
for the most part, not be tax motivated. As Professor Osofsky observes, wash sales that occur within
this window might result when a taxpayer sells stock for nontax reasons (because the taxpayer
anticipates the stock will decline in value further, for instance), but then, within thirty days,
something occurs that prompts the taxpayer to repurchase the stock (the taxpayer revises his or her
projections about the stock’s future performance, for instance). See Leigh Osofsky, Who’s Naughty
and Who’s Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1086–87
(2013) (illustrating the screening problem with tax planning). A sale and repurchase within 30 days
might also result from certain common, non-tax-motivated market transactions such as sales by
mutual fund investors who continue to own an interest in the mutual fund and are enrolled in an
automatic dividend reinvestment plan, as Professor Osofsky observes. Id. at 1097. The propensity
of the wash sale rules to trap unwary taxpayers could be ameliorated by providing taxpayers with
an opportunity to deduct a loss if they could show that the transactions were not tax-motivated (by,
for instance, convincingly demonstrating that the later transaction was not contemplated at the time
of the earlier one). Alternatively, common non-tax-motivated transactions that can produce wash
sales (such as purchase of stock or securities pursuant to an automatic dividend reinvestment plan)
could be carved out from the rules, for instance. For further discussion, see Emily Cauble,
Presumptions of Tax Motivation, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1995 (2020), and Osofsky, supra, at 1099
(“[T]he wash sale rule may be a sharper screening mechanism for tax planning if the rule excluded
certain passive sale and repurchase transactions . . . .”).
58. In particular, although data about the extent to which taxpayers seek assistance at the
planning stage is lacking, existing data does show that a significant number of taxpayers seek
assistance at the tax reporting stage. For example, in 2001, 67% of lower-income taxpayers
claiming the earned income tax credit (EITC) used paid preparers. See Leslie Book, Preventing the
Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (2006) (reporting that, in 2001, 67% of EITC claimants used paid
preparers, compared to 59.4% of the general population).
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completing a tax return. This suggests, for instance, that explicit tax
elections that must be filed at the time of the tax return (particularly if
they are part of the return) are less problematic than tax elections with
earlier deadlines (or even tax elections with the same deadline that are
separately filed).
In the case of form-driven tax consequences that do not involve explicit
tax elections, it may also be possible to offer some relief to unsophisticated taxpayers. In various ways and for various reasons, tax law is generally hostile to efforts by taxpayers to argue against the transactional
form they have selected. One case law doctrine that demonstrates this
hostility has been referred to as the “actual transaction doctrine.”59 According to this doctrine, a taxpayer must report the tax consequences that
follow from the actual transaction undertaken rather than the tax consequences that would have followed from some hypothetical, equivalent
transaction that the taxpayer did not pursue.60 In some circumstances—
for instance, as long as the taxpayer can convincingly demonstrate that
he or she selected a given transactional form instead of the alternative
solely because of inadequate planning,61 as long as the taxpayer has not
already reported the tax consequences of the transaction, and as long as
all parties to the transaction agree to report in a consistent manner—
granting relief to report the more favorable results of the alternative

59. For further discussion of the actual transaction doctrine, see Michael E. Baillif, The Return
Consistency Rule: A Proposal for Resolving the Substance-Form Debate, 48 TAX LAW. 289, 310–
11 (1995) (discussing the history and applicability of the doctrine); Emanuel S. Burstein, The
Impact of Form, and Disavowing Form, on Characterization of Sales Transactions, 66 TAXES 220,
224 (1988); Emily Cauble, Rethinking the Timing of Tax Decisions: Does a Taxpayer Ever Deserve
a Second Chance?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1013, 1021–44 (2012); Kenneth L. Harris, Should There
Be a “Form Consistency” Requirement? Danielson Revisited, 78 TAXES 88, 106–08 (2000); Robert
Thornton Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer’s Right to Assert the Priority of Substance, 44
TAX LAW. 137, 141–43 (1990).
60. For example, if a mother were to sell an asset to a third party and shortly thereafter make a
gift of the cash proceeds to her daughter, the actual transaction doctrine would stand in the way of
an attempt by the mother and daughter to claim the tax consequences that would have resulted had
the mother, instead, given the asset to her daughter and her daughter had sold it to the third party.
Conversely, if a mother were to give an asset to her daughter and, shortly thereafter, the daughter
sold the asset to a third party, the actual transaction doctrine would stand in the way of an attempt
by the mother and daughter to claim the tax consequences that would have resulted had the mother,
instead, sold the asset to the third party and given the proceeds to her daughter.
61. The taxpayers would have to convincingly establish that their situation is not one in which
they chose a given transactional form because they determined that form produced more favorable
tax consequences given the transaction’s expected economic outcome but now that the economic
outcome is different than expected they are trying to claim the tax consequences of an alternative
form that is more favorable in light of the actual economic outcome. See Cauble, supra note 59, at
1064–70 (proposing changes to the law, including no longer applying the actual transaction doctrine
when certain circumstances are met).

2021]

Unsophisticated Taxpayers

349

transaction may be warranted.62 All of these measures could help address
the concern this Essay highlights, namely that form-driven and rule-based
aspects of tax law may make the law more complex for taxpayers who do
not attempt to ascertain the content of law prior to acting.

62. For further discussion of a proposal to grant relief in such circumstances, see Cauble, supra
note 59, at 1064 (describing the proposal).

